USA v. Santo Islaam by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-22-2015 
USA v. Santo Islaam 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Santo Islaam" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 639. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/639 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
                                                                                                  NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 













   
  Appellant 
 
       
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court No.:  1-12-cr-00776-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
       
 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
On June 1, 2015 
 
Before:  RENDELL, HARDIMAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: June 22, 2015) 
  
 
O P I N I O N* 
   
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Appellant Santo Islaam appeals from the District Court’s denial of his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea.  For the reasons articulated below, we will affirm. 
 On February 24, 2012, Camden City Police arrested Appellant after observing him 
providing cash to another individual in exchange for certain small items.  The police 
officers who stopped him found a loaded revolver, two zip-lock bags of heroin, and a bag 
of cocaine on his person.  Appellant was arrested and subsequently indicted for unlawful 
possession of a firearm as a felon, unlawful transportation of firearms, and possession of 
heroin and cocaine.  Appellant was represented by an Assistant Federal Public Defender 
and entered a plea of guilty on September 16, 2013 to Possession of a Weapon by a 
Convicted Felon.  In exchange for this plea, the Government agreed to dismiss his other 
two counts at his sentencing. 
 Subsequently, Appellee filed a pro se letter to the District Court, which it 
interpreted as a Motion for New Counsel and Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea.  In the 
letter, Appellant asserted that his counsel coerced him to plead guilty by advising him 
that he was potentially facing a penalty of 25 years to life if convicted at trial, and that he 
had no realistic chance of being found not guilty.  The District Court appointed him new 
counsel, who represented in the hearing on his withdrawal motion that, if called to testify, 
Appellant would state that the firearm was not his, was not in his possession at the time 
of arrest, and that he was not aware of its existence at the time of his arrest.  Appellant’s 
new counsel also stated that Appellant would testify that the officers who arrested him 
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lied when they stated that they found the firearm on his person, and that it was in fact 
recovered from the wheel well of a nearby car. 
 The District Court denied Appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea, finding that he 
had not met his burden of showing sufficiently strong reasons to justify the withdrawal.  
The Court credited his sworn testimony of his guilt from his prior court appearances over 
his unsworn recantations of his plea through his attorney, and found that he had not 
demonstrated that his original counsel had given him incorrect legal advice, or coerced 
him to plead guilty. 
 We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse 
of discretion.  United States v. Siddons, 660 F.3d 699, 703 (3d Cir. 2011).  A district 
court has the discretion to permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea prior to 
sentencing if the defendant can show “a fair and just reason for requesting the 
withdrawal.”  Fed. R. Crim. Pr. 11(d)(2)(B).  “When determining whether a defendant 
has shown a fair and just reason for withdrawing a guilty plea, a district court must 
consider whether: (1) the defendant asserts his innocence; (2) the defendant proffered 
strong reasons justifying the withdrawal; and (3) the government would be prejudiced by 
the withdrawal.”  Siddons, 660 F.3d at 703.  “Assertions of innocence must be buttressed 
by facts in the record that support a claimed defense.”  Id.  “A shift in defense tactics, a 
change of mind, or the fear of punishment are not adequate reasons to impose on the 
government the expense, difficulty, and risk of trying a defendant who has already 
acknowledged his guilt by pleading guilty.”  Id. at 703 (quoting United States v. Jones, 
336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003)).  
4 
 
 Appellant failed to carry his burden of demonstrating a fair and just reason 
sufficient to justify permitting him to withdraw his guilty plea.  While Appellant asserted 
his innocence, he did not corroborate that claim with objective evidence, such as 
statements from other witnesses or other tangible evidence.  The District Court 
reasonably credited his previous admission of guilt under oath over his later recantations 
of that admission while not under oath – namely, by way of a proffer through his 
attorney. 
 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Appellant’s contention 
that his original trial counsel was ineffective.  “A court will permit a defendant to 
withdraw a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel only if (1) the defendant 
shows that his attorney’s advice was under all the circumstances unreasonable under 
prevailing professional norms, and (2) the defendant shows that he suffered ‘sufficient 
prejudice’ from his counsel’s errors.”  Jones, 336 F.3d at 253-54 (internal citations 
omitted).  Appellant argues that he pled guilty to the gun possession charge despite his 
innocence because his counsel advised him that he had no chance of winning at trial, and 
that the District Court judge had “stacked the deck” in favor of the prosecutor.  However, 
this advice was reasonable.  At trial, the Government would have presented the 
eyewitness testimony of two police officers who would have stated that they saw 
Appellant engage in a drug transaction, and found a gun and drugs on his person upon 
stopping him.  The jury would have likely believed the testimony of the two police 
officers over the Appellant, a convicted felon, particularly because Appellant provided no 
reason why the officers would have framed him for the crime, or how they would have 
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known to look for the firearm in the wheel well of a nearby vehicle.  Appellant faced 25 
years to life imprisonment if convicted by a jury.  Additionally, the Government had 
agreed to drop the drug possession charges against him in exchange for a guilty plea on 
the gun possession charge.   
 In Government of the Virgin Islands v. Berry, we affirmed a district court’s denial 
of a defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  631 F.2d 214, 221 (3d Cir. 1980).  
The defendant argued that he submitted the plea because his counsel mistakenly assumed 
that the defendant’s co-conspirator would testify against him at his own trial, which he 
did not.  Id.  Despite acknowledging this tactical mistake on counsel’s part, the district 
court refused to let him withdraw the plea, and we agreed.  Id.  We see no miscalculation 
or tactical mistake here; rather, counsel’s advice to Appellant was sound.  Therefore, not 
only was counsel’s advice that he take the plea reasonable, it was not an error that caused 
him any prejudice.  Additionally, Appellant put forward no other evidence that his 
counsel exerted coercive pressure on him to plead guilty.   
 Because Appellant has not met his burden under either of the first two Siddons 
factors, the Government did not need to demonstrate that it would have been prejudiced 
by the withdrawal of his guilty plea.  See Jones, 336 F.3d at 255; United States v. Harris, 
44 F.3d 1206, 1210 (3d Cir. 1995).  Therefore, we will affirm. 
